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
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DIA and DOS
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1. TURKEY PREPARING FOR MANEUVERS NEAR SYRIAN BORDER

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Turkey's Fifth Armored Brigade and elements of the 28th Infantry Division located near Ankara are preparing to move by rail to the vicinity of the Syrian border, according to the American service attachés in Ankara. These units had returned to home stations only last month from similar movements undertaken during the Jordanian crisis last spring.

According to Ambassador Warren, Turkey's concern over the security of its southern border may be the cause for these movements. Officers of the Turkish general staff denied that the intention is to pose a threat to Syria and said extensive military maneuvers have been ordered for September and late October prior to annual NATO maneuvers. All military leaves have been canceled for the maneuvers.

The Turks have increased irregular air patrols along the Syrian border and plan to deploy fighter squadrons to bases in southern Turkey "in a realistic maneuver to determine actual capabilities."

There is no evidence available to indicate that the Turkish navy is planning any unusual movements.

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2. CUBAN SITUATION REMAINS TENSE

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Late on 5 September the American embassy in Havana reported persistent unconfirmed rumors of serious discord within the Cuban government and the army. Despite the loyalty shown by army and air force units in drastic action against insurgent forces in Cienfuegos on 5 September, some dissident elements probably do exist within the armed forces, which have been the bulwark of Batista's strength. Cuban officials insist that naval personnel did not join the revolt but most observers disagree. The navy has been suspected of disaffection since Batista's 1952 coup.

Batista has again demonstrated his willingness to use ruthless measures against revolt and can be expected to act quickly to ferret out possible disaffection in the armed forces. Recent events will increase resentment against him, but he will probably be able to maintain his position unless sizable segments of the opposition, including those elements possessing effective arms, coordinate their attacks.

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3. PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGE OF GREEK-TURKISH
MINORITIES RECEIVES HIGH-LEVEL SUPPORT

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[Redacted]

Turkish Ambassador Vergin in Athens has informed Ambassador Allen that he believes the time may have come for another large-scale exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. Citing tensions over the Turkish minorities in Greek Thrace and on Cyprus and the Greek minority and Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul, Vergin indicated that Turkish Prime Minister Menderes is beginning to consider a transfer of populations as a solution to Greek-Turkish problems.

Greek Foreign Minister Averoff, in a subsequent conversation with Allen, said he personally would accept the plan for an exchange of populations. Although Averoff warned that a "sentimental" problem would be created were the Patriarchate of Constantinople moved, he believed that even this issue could be resolved.

Comment

A large-scale Greek-Turkish exchange of populations in 1923 involved some 1,300,000 Greeks from Turkey and nearly 400,000 Moslems from Greece. At present, there are about 90,000 ethnic Turks on Cyprus and over 100,000 in Greece. Approximately 80,000 Greeks live in Istanbul.

A transfer of minorities would eliminate a constant source of friction in Greek-Turkish relations and might pave the way for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The Turks, however, have previously argued that continued British presence on Cyprus is essential to the security of their southern coast.

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5. WEST GERMANY TO SEEK PERMISSION TO PRODUCE
ANTITANK MISSILE

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[Redacted]

The Bonn Foreign Ministry has informed the American embassy that West Germany wants to manufacture an antitank missile now prohibited by the WEU treaty. The

British and French governments and the WEU armaments control agency were informed of this request several weeks ago. According to a Bonn Foreign Ministry official, the British and French "hinted" they would support the German request. Bonn plans to submit a formal request to WEU within a few weeks.

The missile in question is the Cobra I, which can be operated by one man. The Boelkow engineering firm in Stuttgart is prepared to produce a prototype, and the manufacturing cost is alleged to be considerably under the cost of purchase abroad.

Comment

In April, Ludwig Boelkow was quoted by the West German press to the effect that his firm had been engaged for some time, within the limits of the London and Paris agreements, in research on missiles for the German Home Defense Forces. The Cobra I reportedly has a range of up to about one mile and can be guided to a visible target.

The Federal Republic has not previously asked for modification of any of the Paris treaty clauses regulating its armament. The present WEU restrictions on German missile production can be modified on request of the SHAPE commander with approval of two thirds of the WEU council.

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7. INDONESIAN OFFICIALS UNCERTAIN ON OUTCOME
OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE

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Prime Minister Djuanda has told the American ambassador that he is "definitely not pessimistic" about the outcome of the national conference set for 10 September in Djakarta. Both Djuanda and former vice president Hatta, however, continue to feel that about the best that can be hoped for is a temporary compromise which would create better understanding between the disaffected provinces and Djakarta and would lay the basis for further discussions. Djuanda has expressed fear that failure to reach a compromise will result in Sukarno's taking "drastic action."

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On 6 September, Lt. Col. Hussein in Central Sumatra had still not announced whether he would attend the conference. He feels Djakarta should have invited disaffected Colonels Simbolon and Lubis and the former armed forces chief of staff, General Simatupang.

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